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A NEW TRIAL IS IN ORDER BECAUSE 
FLEMING RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
A. APPELLATE COUNSEL FOR FLEMING DID NOT MISREPRESENT THE FACTS. 
The State repeatedly claims that appellate counsel for Fleming misrepresented the record 
in crafting most of the claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. State's brief at 2, 15, 
28, 31. The State's substantive argument, however, does not identify a single instance in which 
counsel for Fleming misrepresented anything in the record. State's brief at 31-37. Rather, the 
State argues facts which support its position that trial counsel performed properly in numerous 
instances, and characterizes the failure of counsel for Fleming to assert these facts as omissions 
which "distort the record to the point of misrepresentation." State's brief at 31-37. 
In raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellate lawyer is to show two 
things: objectively deficient performance and prejudice. See, e.g.. State's brief at 22, citing 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). While no lawyer is permitted to mislead 
1 
a court, e.g., Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3,1 a lawyer raising a claim of ineffective 
assistance is not required to marshal all instances of adequate performance by the trial lawyer. 
Compare Strickland, supra with State's brief at 31-37. 
Review of each of the State's claims of misrepresentation by omission demonstrates that 
appellate counsel did not misrepresent the record and that trial counsel performed in an 
objectively deficient manner. 
The State faults counsel for Fleming for failing to inform the Court that it was trial 
counsel who introduced Porter's testimony regarding the drug vial, which supported the defense 
lThe rule provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; 
(2) Fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid 
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client; 
(3) Fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to 
the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by 
opposing counsel; or 
(4) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material 
evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial 
measures. 
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and 
apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by 
Rule 1.6. 
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. 
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts 
known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, 
whether or not the facts are adverse. 
2 
theory that the aggravated kidnapping and robbery allegations were Porter's revenge for 
Fleming's selling him rock salt instead of methamphetamine. State's brief at 31. 
If the Court will review pages 3 and 4 of Fleming's opening brief, the Court may confirm 
that the brief correctly identifies the defense theory of the case.2 If the Court will turn to page 5 
of Fleming's opening brief, the Court will confirm that counsel twice informed the Court that 
trial counsel introduced the drug vial evidence.3 
Fleming maintains that trial counsel performed in an objectively deficient manner in 
failing to point out the bizarre nature of Porter's claim that Fleming, a supposed meth addict, 
handed over his vial of meth to his supposed aggravated kidnapping and robbery victim, and in 
failing to challenge Porter regarding his testimony that he held the vial carefully with two fingers 
to preserve Fleming's fingerprints (R. 152 at 101) with evidence that he walked into a crowded 
7-11 during the time frame that he was supposedly doing this (e.g., R. 152 at 86). See Fleming's 
opening brief at 22-25. 
2The brief provides: 
In contrast, Fleming's theory of the case was that Porter was at 
Wayne's gas station, where many people conduct illegal drug sales, to buy 
illegal drugs, and that Porter's allegations of kidnaping and robbery were 
Porter's revenge for Fleming's selling Porter rock salt when Porter thought 
he was buying methamphetamine with the money from the ATMs (E.g. R. 
152 at 64-69). 
3The brief provides: 
While Porter did not mention it on direct examination, Porter 
conceded on cross-examination that there was a vial containing what 
appeared to be drugs in his car, and only during cross-examination, he 
claimed that Fleming asked Porter to hold Fleming's vial of 
methamphetamine during the course of this supposed robbery and 
kidnaping, before any of the visits to the ATM (R. 152 at 101). 
3 
The State faults counsel for Fleming for failing to include trial counsel's closing 
argument that Porter's telling Fleming that he could not smoke in his car showed that Porter was 
not afraid of Fleming. State's brief at 32. As the State notes in footnote 2 on page 5 of its own 
brief, the smoking conversation preceded the robbery, and thus Porter's lack of fear of Fleming at 
that point was not remarkable, and counsel for Fleming had no intent to mislead the Court by 
omitted this evidence. 
The idea that Fleming would ask permission to smoke in Porter's car, however, seems 
quite inconsistent with other statements attributed to him by Porter (i.e. that Fleming repeatedly 
threatened to kill Porter, and told Porter to "let him the hell out" of the car and "don't fucking 
talk to" Thomas, State's brief at 10), and thus, in failing to bring this to the jurors' attention, trial 
counsel performed in an objectively deficient manner. See Fleming's opening brief at 22-25. 
The State claims that there is nothing in the record to support the assertion that Porter was 
searching his car when he found the vial before calling the police. State's brief at 32. Porter's 
testimony that he found the vial wedged in between the two parts of his car seat before calling the 
police (R. 152 at 109) supports the assertion that Porter searched his car before calling the 
police.4 
The State argues that emphasizing Porter's claim that he searched for the vial before 
calling the police would have undercut Fleming's defense that Porter willingly bought the vial 
4
 The State also argues, "Given that Porter had just gotten out of the driver's seat, 
there is no reason to believe that he had to 'search' his car in order to discover the vial." 
State's brief at 32. 
Fleming hereby moves this Court to reconsider his motion for a remand pursuant 
to Utah R. App. 23B, so that the Court is not misled in resolving this case. 
4 
from Fleming. State's brief at 32. To the contrary. Porter's searching his car before calling the 
police is consistent with the defense that Porter was a drug user with something to hide from the 
police, and his telling the police that he found the vial while searching his car, rather than telling 
the police that he bought it from Fleming, supports the defense theory that Porter hatched up his 
kidnapping and robbery allegations against Fleming in revenge. Porter's taking time to search 
his car before calling the police is also inconsistent with his claim that he was kidnapped, robbed 
and threatened with murder. 
While the State is correct that Sharon Thompson testified to numerous facts which 
supported the defense theory, State's brief at 32-33, the State does not acknowledge that Sharon 
Thompson's testimony was the only evidence the State had to corroborate Porter's claims that he 
was being robbed and kidnapped, and was not involved in a drug deal gone bad. Had the jurors 
been informed of her having received immunity for three serious felony offenses in exchange for 
her testimony, and had trial counsel reiterated her testimony that Porter withdrew the money with 
Porter's permission and after he repeatedly gave her his personal information number, this would 
have aided the defense in challenging her testimony that "at some point" she knew what they 
were doing was "wrong." (R. 152 at 120). 
The State argues that Fleming could not have used Thompson's testimony to aid in his 
defense, because he knew that Porter's purported consent to her use of the card was coerced. 
State's brief at 32. This argument is not supported by any evidence and cannot be supported with 
citation to the record. Fleming never testified. It was his theory of the case that the encounter 
between him and Porter was a consensual drug deal, which involved no kidnapping or robbery 
(R. 152at64-69). 
5 
The State claims that counsel for Fleming exaggerates in referring to the two bladed 
implement trial counsel introduced into evidence as a "weapon/'' and argues that it is more fairly 
characterized as a tool. State's brief at 34. "Weapon" is the word used by the State's trial 
prosecutor, when she led the investigating detective to testify that the implement trial counsel 
introduced was consistent with the "weapon" he took from Fleming upon his arrest, a photo of 
which implement trial counsel introduced (R. 152 at 148). 
The State suggests that trial counsel was performing in an objectively reasonable fashion 
in introducing this weapon or tool, in an effort to show that Porter adopted the detective's 
description of the implement found on Fleming at the time of his arrest. State's brief at 34-35. 
The State also suggests that the implement introduced by defense counsel looks innocuous, with 
blades which "look very much like what one might see on nail clippers or on a very small pocket 
knife." State's brief at 34. 
Particularly given that the implement that trial counsel introduced was consistent with 
what Porter claimed to have felt Fleming pressing against his neck during the aggravated 
kidnapping and aggravated robbery (e.g., R. 152 at 148), given that Fleming's conviction for 
aggravated robbery involved proof of a weapon, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302, and given that 
the implement depicted in the defense exhibit fell within the definition of dangerous weapon in 
the jury instructions,5 trial counsel's introducing proof that Fleming was carrying a weapon 
i
 5
 Instruction 19 states in relevant part: 
"Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury, or a facsimile or representation of the item, and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads 
the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury; or 
6 
on his person consistent with that described by Porter, at the time of Fleming's arrest 
some two months after the alleged offenses, was not reasonable trial strategy. 
The trial court implicitly so recognized when she struck the defense exhibit from 
evidence and instructed the jurors to disregard it (R. 152 at 162). 
The State concedes that trial counsel performed deficiently in introducing the only 
evidence that the financial card transactions involved more than $1,000. State's brief at 
35. 
The State claims that noting the discrepancy between Porter's account of when the 
crimes allegedly occurred and the receipts showing the time of the ATM transactions 
would not have advanced Fleming's theory, and also notes that the detective testified that 
the ATM receipts bore two time stamps on them, and that he did not know if the 
handwriting next to one stamp on each receipt reflecting "local time" was accurate (R. 
152 at 147). 
By reviewing the detective's handwritten times on Exhibit 1, this Court can 
confirm that the stamps labeled "local time" accurately reflect local time, and demonstrate 
that all of the ATM transactions occurred from 8:19 to 9:33 p.m. before Porter could have 
arrived in Salt Lake City after he left Provo at around 9:00 under his version of events (R. 
152 at 70-72). 
(b) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other 
manner that the actor is in control of such an item. 
(R. 116). 
7 
Porter's telling the police the transactions occurred later than they actually did is 
significant because it shows that he was not truthful with them with regard to the time of 
the alleged offenses which he reported the very night they allegedly occurred, and 
highlights the significance of trial counsel's failure to ask Porter why he took the time to 
search his car before he called the police. 
After reviewing the briefs and record, this Court should address the merits of the 
IAC claims and should reject the State's claims that appellate counsel for Fleming 
misrepresented the record. 
B. THE CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IS ADEQUATELY BRIEFED. 
The State argues that Fleming's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
insufficiently briefed, because counsel for Fleming cited no authority specific to each 
claim of objectively deficient performance, because counsel's arguments concerning 
objectively deficient performance totaled only six pages, and because counsel did not 
acknowledge any reasonable strategy trial counsel may have had, or analyze the claims in 
the context of this strategy. State's brief at 30. The State claims that counsel failed to 
analyze how the objectively deficient performance of trial counsel prejudiced Fleming's 
case, and that counsel '"dump[ed] the burden of argument and research" on both the 
Court and the State." State's brief at 30. 
As a matter of law, in raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an 
appellate lawyer is to show two things: objectively deficient performance and prejudice. 
8 
See, e.g.. State's brief at 22, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 
(1984). There is no requirement that a lawyer raising such a claim identify potential 
strategies, or discuss how particular actions support such strategies. See, e.g., Strickland. 
There is no requirement that a lawyer utilize a certain number of pages in making an 
ineffectiveness claim,6 or that counsel cite to separate authorities for each instance of 
objectively deficient performance. See Strickland. There is no requirement that a lawyer 
raising such a claim analyze prejudice in the context of the attorney's "whole trial 
strategy." Compare State's brief at 30 (emphasis in State's brief) with Strickland, supra. 
As a matter of fact, counsel for Fleming did acknowledge the defense theory of the 
case on pages 3 and 4 of the opening brief,7 and compared the evidence supporting the 
State's theory to that supporting Fleming's. See Fleming's opening brief at 4-6. Counsel 
discussed several instances in which trial counsel failed to introduce evidence helpful to 
the defense and introduced evidence harmful to the defense or helpful to the prosecution, 
and compared this performance to that which resulted in conditional reversal in Fisher v. 
6This Court routinely resolves IAC claims in fewer than six pages. See, e ^ , Cota 
v. State, 2005 UT App 242, 2005 WL 1243752 (unpublished opinion, disposing of 
ineffective assistance claim on the merits in approximately one page). 
7The brief provides: 
In contrast, Fleming's theory of the case was that Porter was at 
Wayne's gas station, where many people conduct illegal drug sales, to buy 
illegal drugs, and that Porter's allegations of kidnaping and robbery were 
Porter's revenge for Fleming's selling Porter rock salt when Porter thought 
he was buying methamphetamine with the money from the ATMs (E.g. R. 
152 at 64-69). 
9 
Gibson. 282 F.3d 1283, 1307 (10th Cir. 2002). Kg, Fleming's opening brief at 22-25. 
Finally, she argued that Fleming was prejudiced by the specific instances of objectively 
deficient performance, and that there was a reasonable probability of a different result in 
the absence of the objectively deficient performance. See Fleming's opening brief at 28-
32. 
Because counsel complied with the requirements of Strickland and did not dump 
research and arguments burdens on the Court or State, this Court should thus reject the 
State's claim of insufficient briefing. 
The State did not refute or address the merits of Fleming's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims. See State's brief at 28-37. Because Fleming has demonstrated a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result in the absence of counsel's objectively 
deficient performance, this Court should reverse his convictions and remand for a new 
trial. See Strickland, supra. 
II 
REVERSAL OF THE AGGRAVATED KIDNAPING COUNT 
IS REQUIRED BY THE ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
AND VERDICT. 
Based on the law and argument set forth on pages 19 through 22, Fleming agrees 
with the State that he must establish ineffective assistance of counsel in order to obtain 
relief from the erroneous jury instruction to which trial counsel assented. See id. 
The State contends that trial counsel did not perform in an objectively deficient 
manner, but acted reasonably in failing to object to the jury instruction defining 
10 
aggravated kidnapping, a first degree minimum mandatory offense, in three alternative 
ways, two of which were not charged or bound over, and in failing to object to the 
absence of a special verdict requiring the jurors to select one of the factual theories 
underlying that conviction. State's brief at 25. The State's theory of reasonable 
performance is that the intent with which the aggravated kidnapping occurred was 
irrelevant to the defense, which sought acquittal without consideration of the intent 
element. Id. 
The fact that Fleming was asserting his innocence did not absolve counsel of his 
duty to properly raise all objections and raise all issues in the trial court. See, e.g.. State 
v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at ^ 10, 67 P.3d 1005. Regardless of what Fleming's 
defense was, permitting the prosecution to present two additional factual theories under 
which the jury may have convicted Fleming of this first degree minimum mandatory 
offense was not reasonable, particularly when these theories were not charged, bound 
over or defended against. Cf. id-
The State argues that Fleming was not prejudiced by the inclusion of two extra 
theories of conviction for aggravated kidnapping, because the jurors were given a correct 
elements instruction, because the jurors were instructed to reach a unanimous verdict, 
because the prosecution's argument and the evidence supported only the charged theory 
and did not support the two alternative theories, and because the jury's aggravated 
robbery conviction demonstrates that the jury was unanimous as to the correct theory of 
11 
aggravated kidnapping. State's brief at 25-28. 
The State's argument does mollify the jury instruction's erroneously including two 
uncharged theories for the aggravated kidnapping charge, because the argument not 
account for the jury instruction requiring the jurors to give equal weight to all the 
instructions (R. 97), or for the law which presumes that jurors follow all instructions. 
See, e.g.. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 272 (Utah 1998) ("Moreover, our judicial 
system greatly relies upon the jury's integrity to uphold the jury oath, including its 
promise to follow all of the judge's instructions."). 
The State's reliance on State v. Germotito, 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993), and State v. 
Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1307 (Utah 1986), is insufficient. While the jurors' conviction of 
Germonto for robbery satisfied the court with regard to the unanimity of the second 
degree murder conviction, Germonto, and while the jurors' conviction of Shaffer for 
aggravated robbery alleviated the court's concerns about the constitutionality of a 
separate aggravator to sustain the aggravated murder conviction, Shaffer, the Utah 
Supreme Court had no opportunity in either case to address the remaining issues raised 
here, that the jurors may have convicted Fleming of aggravated kidnapping on the basis of 
a theory that was never charged, bound over or defended against. Compare Germonto 
and Shaffer. 
Particularly given the dubious nature of the State's case, see Fleming's opening 
brief at 18-21, this Court should hold that there is a reasonable probability of a different 
12 
result in the absence of this error, and order a new trial. See id. 
III. 
THE AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING CONVICTION SHOULD 
BE VACATED OR MERGE INTO THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CONVICTION. 
In arguing against vacating the aggravated kidnapping conviction, or merging it 
into the aggravated robbery conviction, the State argues that the aggravated robbery was 
complete when Fleming took Porter's wallet, watch, CD player, and book of CDs, and 
that the aggravated kidnapping charge is sustained by the independent detention which 
occurred after that point. State's brief at 39. 
As this case was charged and bound over, the ATM transactions were part of the 
protracted robbery (R. 40; R. 152 at 41). At trial, the prosecutor argued in accordance 
with the State's position on appeal, that the aggravated robbery was complete upon 
Fleming's taking Porter's wallet and personal property, and that the kidnapping 
conviction could be justified on the theory that the ATM-related detention constituted 
flight from the aggravated robbery (R. 152 at 155). 
The State argues that in State v. Finlavson. 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243, the court 
refused to sustain a separate kidnapping charge, because "defendant's 
actions following the sexual assault were done with the intent to facilitate 
flight was not presented to the jury." Id. at p 2 , n.3. Rather, "the only 
argument the prosecution presented to support the aggravated kidnaping 
charge was the handcuffing of the victim." Id. 
State's brief at 43. 
If this Court will review the Finlayson decision, the Court will confirm that the 
13 
Utah Supreme Court did note that the aggravated kidnapping charge was argued to the 
jury solely on the basis of the handcuffing, and that the prosecution did not argue that the 
defendant's actions after the sex offense could justify the aggravated kidnapping charge 
as proof of actions done with the intent to facilitate flight. Id. at Tf 32, n.3. By reading 
further in the opinion, however, this Court will confirm that the Utah Supreme Court did 
not refuse to sustain the aggravated kidnapping charge because the intent to facilitate 
flight argument was waived. But see State's brief at 43. 
Rather, the court expressly rejected on the merits the argument that the aggravated 
kidnaping charge could be sustained on the theory that Finlayson's conduct in making the 
victim wait while he got dressed, in putting a jacket over her head, and in driving her 
around for more than half an hour longer than was necessary to take her home, constituted 
actions done with the intent to facilitate flight after the commission of the sexual crimes. 
Id- at ^j 33-35. The court held that to engage in flight as that term is defined under the 
law, a defendant, at a minimum, had to both leave the scene of the crime and make 
subsequent efforts to conceal himself, withdraw or avoid arrest. Id. 
Mr. Fleming's aggravated kidnapping charge was based on the sole theory that he 
detained Porter "with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted commission of a 
felony, or flight from a felony" under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(l)(b)(ii) (R. 40). 
Assuming arguendo that the State is correct that the robbery was complete when 
Fleming took Porter's wallet, watch, CD player and CDs, his subsequent detention of 
14 
Porter was not done with the intention to facilitate the attempt or commission of the 
robbery, because that offense was complete. And none of his actions in taking Porter to 
the ATMs were taken with an intent to facilitate flight from the robbery as that term is 
defined by Finlayson, because the actions involved no efforts to conceal himself, 
withdraw or avoid arrest. Accordingly, the aggravated kidnapping conviction cannot 
stand. See id. Because trial counsel's failure to move to vacate or merge the aggravated 
kidnapping conviction constituted objectively deficient and prejudicial representation. 
Compare Finlayson at f 24 (finding failure to challenge aggravated kidnapping conviction 
with rape and sodomy convictions was not valid strategy, but was objectively deficient). 
Conclusion 
This Court should reverse both the aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnaping 
convictions, because Fleming received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
This Court should reverse Mr. Fleming's aggravated kidnaping conviction because 
the jury instructions and verdict may well have resulted in a non-unanimous verdict, or a 
conviction premised on a factual theory that was not charged or bound over after the 
preliminary hearing. 
Because the evidence failed to demonstrate aggravated kidnaping independent 
from the aggravated robbery, and should have resulted in the vacation and/or merger of 
the aggravated kidnaping count, this Court should forbid the retrial of the aggravated 
kidnaping count. See Finlayson, supra. 
15 
Respectfully submitted this May 31, 2005. 
Eliz^betWHunt 
Attorney Tor Mr.' Fleming 
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